Partnering with the U.S.

Marching Orders
How Canada abandoned peacekeeping – and why the UN needs us now more than ever

Partnering with the U.S.

Despite the strong international consensus on the utility and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, views within the Canadian Forces remain divided between “the pragmatists” and “the hawks.” The pragmatists see the value of peacekeeping in maintaining confidence in CF missions abroad and support for the military budget. In contrast, the hawks feel that the public peacekeeping image prevents the military from winning large increases to military spending, purchasing new equipment that might appear aggressive in nature, and taking on more “robust” combat missions abroad. It could be said that there are still some “doves” in the Canadian Forces who see the value in UN peacekeeping, but they have been virtually silenced.

In the wake of September 11, 2001, the hawks have clearly won the debate within the defence lobby. They are leading the charge in challenging Canada’s peacekeeping role and are working hard to convince the public to embrace a new war-fighting role for the military, especially alongside U.S. armed forces.

Meanwhile, deep structural and even cultural changes within the military are taking root, locking in the new posture that has been brought about in recent years, especially in regard to our military ties with the United States.

According to the Royal Military College of Canada’s Joel Sokolsky and Carleton University doctoral candidate Philippe Lagassé, the Canada-U.S. security relationship has evolved in the last five years at a pace unseen since the early Cold War:

In spite of Ottawa’s decision to eschew a role in the Iraq war and the U.S. ballistic missile defence system, Canada has played an active part in the war on terror. Since the fall of 2001, Ottawa has launched several counter-terrorism initiatives at home, joined the Americans in dislodging the Taliban in Afghanistan, and worked with Washington to improve security on the continent and at the Canada-U.S. border.

As the authors point out, despite Canada’s decision not to participate in the Iraq war or the U.S. ballistic missile defence program, Canada has played a significant role in the U.S.-led War on Terror:

Canada’s contribution to the global campaign against transnational terrorism is focused on Afghanistan. In late 2001, Canadian frigates joined American [aircraft] carrier battle groups in hunting and capturing Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Arabian Sea. Since that time, over 20 Canadian ships have deployed to the Arabian Sea to join or lead battle groups and conduct maritime interdictions, force-support and force-projection operations. This naval contribution is one of the largest from a NATO member . . . .

In late 2005, under the auspices of U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom, the Canadian military deployed a provincial reconstruction team to the Kandahar region, and Canadian special operations forces are helping the U.S. military hunt and kill Taliban and Al Qaeda near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. A CF brigade headquarters and an army task force also deployed to the region in 2006. These deployments indicate the Canadian government grasps the link between overseas commitments and maintaining good bilateral relations [with the United States].

All told, Canada’s overseas contribution to the global war on terrorism is far from insignificant. Indeed, the Canadian presence in Afghanistan reflects Ottawa’s view that a part in the war on terror’s “away game” is worth as much to Washington as any contributions to the “home game” – even though the home game may be of greater import to the bilateral security relationship.36

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